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Abstract
Objective: There are concerns that some non-profit organisations, financed by the
food industry, promote industry positions in research and policy materials. Using
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, we test the proposition that the
International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), one prominent non-for profit in
international health and nutrition research, promotes industry positions.
Design: U.S. Right to Know filed five FOI from 2015 to 2018 covering commu-
nications with researchers at four US institutions: Texas A&M, University of
Illinois, University of Colorado and North Carolina State University. It received
15 078 pages, which were uploaded to the University of California San
Francisco’s Industry Documents Library. We searched the Library exploring
it thematically for instances of: (1) funding research activity that supports
industry interests; (2) publishing and promoting industry-sponsored positions
or literature; (3) disseminating favourable material to decision makers and the
public and (4) suppressing views that do not support industry.
Results: Available emails confirmed that ILSI’s funding by corporate entities
leads to industry influence over some of ILSI activities. Emails reveal a pattern
of activity in which ILSI sought to exploit the credibility of scientists and
academics to bolster industry positions and promote industry-devised content
in its meetings, journal and other activities. ILSI also actively seeks to margin-
alise unfavourable positions.
Conclusions:We conclude that undue influence of industry through third-party
entities like ILSI requires enhanced management of conflicts of interest by
researchers. We call for ILSI to be recognised as a private sector entity rather
than an independent scientific non-profit, to allow for more appropriate
appraisal of its outputs and those it funds.
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Multi-national food, beverage, agrichemical and supple-
ments industries fund significant research and activities
around public health and nutrition. It is widely acknowl-
edged that researchers’ and professionals’ ties to industry
have the potential to influence their objectivity, enabling
industry-friendly research andmessages to reach the public
in ways that veil any potential influence(1). Although major
multinational companies including Mars Inc. and The
Coca-Cola Company (hereafter Coke) have recently com-
mitted to improving the transparency of their research
and professional activities following increasing press
scrutiny(2), declarations by those they fund in journals
and scientific circulars are not always complete(3), often
providing little or inadequate information about the involve-
ment of funding entities and their industry sponsors(4,5).
Further complicating the picture, multinational compa-
nies often distribute funds via intermediary bodies, such
as non-profit organisations that support research, engage-
ment and policy activity favourable to the industry’s inter-
ests, like the International Food Information Council
(IFIC)(6) and the now closed Global Energy Balance
Network (GEBN)(3). When these organisations are cited
as funders, often there is a lack of understanding that they
receive vast amounts of support from industry, despite
them having been found by researchers and the press
to be lobbying and fronting industry interests(7–10).
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One major industry-funded institution active in public
health and nutrition is the International Life Sciences
Institute (ILSI), a non-profit established in 1978 by Dr. Alex
Malaspina. Malaspina was previously a Coke Scientific and
Regulatory Affairs executive, who founded ILSI and then
was its President until 2001. He has maintained involvement
in ILSI’s conferences and funding activities, including award-
ing the Malaspina International Scholars Travel Award with
ILSI and Coke, long after his retirement however(11–13). ILSI
is registered as a non-profit [501(c)(3)] and states its mission
as being to ‘provide science that improves human health
and well-being and safeguards the environment’(14,15).
At present, ILSI comprises eighteen bodies designed to
promote a ‘global partnerships for a healthier world’, which
include: the ILSI Research Foundation, ILSI Health and
Environmental Institute, ILSI Europe, ILSI North America,
ILSI Mexico, ILSI Mesoamerica, ILSI North Andean, ILSI
Brazil, ILSI Argentina, ILSI South Andean, ILSI Middle
East, ILSI South Africa, ILSI Southeast Asia Region, ILSI
Taiwan, ILSI Korea, ILSI India, ILSI Focal Point in China
and ILSI Japan(16). These bodies are brought together
through a strategy called ‘One ILSI’(16). ILSI received an
initial endowment of $22 million from the industry(11),
expanding globally over the following decades(14), and
its bodies are now funded primarily by industry ‘members’,
with ILSI reporting that of its US$17.7 million income in
2015, $11·6 million came from what was termed ‘member
support’ (see Box 1)(17).
ILSI maintains that despite this funding, it is neutral and
‘is a non-profit, worldwide organization whose mission is
to provide science that improves human health and well-
being and safeguards the environment. ILSI and ILSI enti-
ties foster public-private scientific partnerships to address
knowledge gaps to benefit public good’(21).
Despite claims of independence, ILSI’s bodies have
been subject to scrutiny for their corporate engagements
with questions about whether ILSI – which we refer to
here as all eighteen of its organisational bodies – acts
to front for the food and beverage industries, promoting
the commercial interests of their members, or these indus-
try on the whole, around the world, including in emerging
markets like China(22,23). In 2000, even those at the WHO
have questioned its nature and engagements with different
industries, including the tobacco industry(24). Mars Inc.
pulled out of its ILSI membership, effective from the end
of 2018, with public statements that ILSI is involved in
‘advocacy-led studies’, implicitly outing it as a front
group, following public controversy over a research
study that ILSI had backed(25). This following a process
of the global candy maker committing to more robust
transparency and openness, a trend emerging in the
face of increasing public scrutiny over the commercial
determinants of health. Notably, Mars’ statements sup-
ported previous anecdotal accusations around ILSI’s
involvements, implying that it likely was deploying tac-
tics and learning from tobacco’s past strategies to thwart
regulation, thus reopening discussion about whether
indeed ILSI is a non-profit acting for the public good
or indeed an arm of private entities acting to further com-
mercial interests under another face.
In the wake of these public accusations, we ask: how
much separation there really is between industry and
researchers when industry-funded groups like ILSI
provide the backing for a study? Does ILSI promote
industry positions? We use US state Freedom of Infor-
mation (FOI) requests entered into the University of
California San Francisco Library’s Industry Documents
Library to explore how ILSI conducts itself with researchers
working in North America and what is said about the
organisation and its former and present executives about
ILSI North America, ILSI Global and ILSI Research’s activ-
ities and conduct.
Methods
Between June 2015 and February 2018, U.S. Right to Know,
a non-profit consumer and public health group, submitted
US state public records requests – henceforth referred to
as FOI – to public academic institutions: Texas A&M, the
University of Illinois, University of Colorado and North
Carolina State University. U.S. Right to Know subsequently
sent these requests to the UCSF database, which are now
available at https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/
food/. U.S. Right to Know has extensive experience in
transparency research and selected the relevant persons
to request information from due to their known past con-
nections with industry or industry-funded bodies. The
requests yielded a total of 15 078 pages in PDF format,
Box 1: Sources funding to ILSI
ILSI acknowledges it receives funding from industry.
The documents we received reveal that in 2012, ILSI
received $528 500 in contributions from CropLife
International, a $500 000 contribution from Monsanto
and $163 500 from Coca-Cola(18).
A draft 2013 ILSI Internal Revenue Service tax return
shows that ILSI received $337 000 from Coca-Cola and
more than $100 000 each from Monsanto, Syngenta,
Dow AgroSciences, Pioneer Hi-Bred, Bayer Crop
Science and BASF(19).
A draft 2016 ILSI North America Internal Revenue
Service tax return shows a $317 827 contribution from
PepsiCo, contributions greater than $200 000 from
Mars, Coca-Cola and Mondelez and contributions greater
than $100 000 from General Mills, Nestle, Kellogg,
Hershey, Kraft, Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Starbucks
Coffee, Cargill, Unilever and Campbell Soup(20).
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including 1347 pages from Texas A&M, 346 pages from
the University of Illinois, 11 714 pages from the first FOI
to the University of Colorado and a further 221 pages on
the second FOI to it, and 1450 pages from North
Carolina State University. An independent researcher
(S.S.) explored the documents in the database for indica-
tions of ILSI’s activities and role.
These documents were analysed by twomembers of the
research team, who read the received documents inde-
pendently of each other. One researcher (G.R.) undertook
an initial review of the documents received by manually
reading all the received pages of the documents, searching
for interactions between ILSI bodies and corporations or
individual names known to be associated with industry
members, including Alex Malaspina, leading to a follow-
up FOI with the University of Colorado due to his on-going
engagement with ILSI across the initial document batch
period, despite ILSI’s claims to the contrary recently on
its website(21). Because these requests capture diverse
communications, and often involved someone from
ILSI being cc’d into an email on an unrelated subject,
documents that made no reference to ILSI’s activities
directly were not tagged by this researcher.
The second researcher (S.S.), trained in law and public
health, then went through the database to identify emails
or attachments containing information on ILSI and industry
interaction, analysing them for instances of potential indus-
try influence, as well as seeking to highlight instances
where data disconfirmed – that is, conflicted with, refuted
or provided a negative instance of – the themes and catego-
ries of analysis(26). She close read all results in the database
pertaining to ILSI and extracted relevant results to for dis-
cussions of ILSI by its employees or others who either
work with it now, of have done so in the past, either
as employees or as trusted others. We provide references
to ILSI’s own statements, policies and practices to allow
readers to compare the email text to their own organisa-
tional positions. We also note the position of those who
sent the emails in relation to the organisation and note
where the information is historical and therefore may
not be current practice. Our research therefore sits as a
case study, shedding light on industry influence and
pointing out potential issues needing further investiga-
tion. The emails act to highlight potential sites for further
engagement and research on improving practice.
To do this, the researcher (S.S.) engaged in a descriptive
qualitative process of data analysis, which aims to explore a
set of related but distinct categories of industry manipula-
tion and influence, searching for instances that confirm or
refute views that ILSI acts in this manner. She studied the
FOI emails and all received attachments, which included
some meeting minutes, to identify instances of commonal-
ity and variation with those types in White and Bero’s
framework, working with those categories that could be
applied to food entities and non-profits(27). The researcher
coded instances of discussion of: (1) funding research that
supports industry interests; (2) publishing industry-
sponsored positions or literature under ILSI without
reference to industry; (3) dissemination of favourable
material to decision makers and/or the public through
ILSI or ILSI organised events and (4) suppression of
views that do not support industry through ILSI. We note
that this is not a hierarchical arrangement; the categories
in a typology are related and not subsidiary to one another.
Following best qualitative practices, to the extent
possible, we quote directly from the documents ‘in their
own words’. To reduce bias, all researchers convened to
discuss the identified content and consider alternative
interpretations. We report all emails referenced in an
online accessible format, so that our interpretations are
accessible and replicable to all readers and the public.
It was not possible to perform quantitative analysis of
the received emails without comprehensive fully repre-
sentative sample of the universe of possible quotes, since
the batch is likely incomplete. We looked qualitatively
for instances that confirmed or refuted an instance, rather
than measuring numerical frequency.
Results
In line with White and Bero’s framework(27), we identified
four forms of industry involvement through ILSI’s activity
globally. We consider each in turn.
International Life Sciences Institute funding
research activity that supports industry interests
ILSI funds extensive research and other activities, including
meetings and conferences, internationally through its
constituent bodies. Attachments to the emails reveal
ILSI supports travel and attendance at these conferences
and professional meetings, providing allowances for
those promoting research or favourable positions to
policy makers, professional associations and scientific
meetings(28). ILSI cites that these are reimbursements
for expenses(21). We note, however, that such reimburse-
ments should be declared generally as past research on
the pharmaceutical industry suggests travel payments,
meeting attendance costs reimbursements, food and
beverage provision, and the like can influence profes-
sional decision-making and practices(29,30). This research
confirms that it is not simply grants, employment or large
gifts that have influence but also smaller activities that
can create a favourable predisposition that might con-
sciously or subconsciously impact on research.
We also note the emails confirm that corporations can
earmark contributions to support specific ILSI initiatives.
For example, the Coca-Cola Company gave $325 000
for 2014 and $350 000 for 2015 to fund Platform for
International Partnerships activities (ILSI’s programme for
‘managing ILSI’s interactions’ with the WHO and FAO)
and the Malaspina International Scholar Travel Award
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(which is ILSI’s outreach programme for young scientists)(28).
Draft minutes from a 2015 ILSI Board of Trustees meeting
reveal that several of its programmes are funded specifically
by The Coca-Cola Company, which directs how these funds
are used:
The Restricted Programs include the ILSI Platform
for International Partnerships and the contribu-
tions from The Coca-Cola Company. The latter
have been distributed as requested by the donor
to specific activities, e.g., Malaspina International
Scholars Travel Award, and food safety training
in Asia and in Africa. The Branch Staff Travel grant
fund is also included in the Restricted Programs.
The International Brach (sic) Activity includes funding
held for the ILSI Focal Point in China (operating funds
as well as training funds) and Latin American branches
coordination. A new, part-time Latin American
branches coordinator position has been established
with funding from The Coca-Cola Company(28).
While it is not unusual for donors to earmark funds for a
specified purpose, the completeness of disclosures around
the sources of ILSI funding of research varies significantly
among publications it supports. For example, in one recent
study that concluded controversially that ‘there seems to
be no reliable evidence indicating that any of the recom-
mended daily caloric thresholds for sugar intake are
strongly associated with negative health effects’, the
funding statement made no specific mention of industry
involvement, instead only listing funding by ILSI. Following
publication of an Associated Press article questioning it(31),
alongwith subsequent expression of concerns, a correction
was issued(32) and the statement updated to read:
Financial Support: This project was funded by the
Technical Committee on Dietary Carbohydrates of ILSI
North America. The authors wrote the protocol, the
scope of which was reviewed and approved by ILSI
and conducted the study independently from ILSI(32).
Subsequently, new, more robust examples have emerged
around ILSI funding:
The present review results from a workshop organ-
ized by the European Branch of ILSI Europe. This
publication was coordinated by Dr. Peter Putz,
Scientific Project Manager at ILSI Europe. The work-
shop was funded by the ILSI Europe Obesity and
Diabetes Task Force, the ILSI Europe Metabolic
Imprinting Task Force, ILSI Brazil, ILSI North
America and ILSI Southeast Asia Region. Industry
members of the taskforces are listed on the ILSI
Europe website at http://www.ilsi.eu. For further
information about ILSI Europe, please email info@
ilsieurope.be or call þ32 2 771 00 14. The opinions
expressed herein and the conclusions of this publica-
tion are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of ILSI Europe nor those of its
member companies(33).
This example was mirrored in other recent publications(34),
and we note that declaring affiliations, any research sup-
port and funding, including of travel allowances and sti-
pends, are critical to allow the reader a clearer picture of
any potential bias, whether conscious or unconscious.
We also note that ILSI that it is ‘well aware of potential
conflict of interest issues and has been actively studying
and publishing on this topic’, with a series of recent papers
considering scientific integrity and openness(35–38).
Publishing industry-approved positions or
literature under International Life Sciences
Institute without reference to industry input
The emails also revealed that since ILSI is aware that
industry ties may reduce the credibility of its papers,
any influence on papers by industry should not extend
to co-authorship. An email exchange between Dr. Bruce
Chassy, Professor Emeritus of the Department of Food
Sciences and Human Nutrition at the University of
Illinois, and Dr. Kevin Glenn, Monsanto Senior Science
Fellow and the Scientific Affairs Pipeline Lead within
Monsanto Regulatory and past Chair of the International
Food Biotechnology Committee of ILSI, highlights the use
of academic authors to add authority, while allowing industry
hidden input into ILSI publications(39). Chassy writes:
: : : I think to have credibility the article should be
authored by academics. That is not to say anybody
who wants to help shouldn’t be able to contribute
useful parts to it, but it needs to be distanced from
industry. I have shared my view with both you and
Ray before that having industry and academics
co-write papers for ILSI could come back to bite all
of us some day. Not a good idea. A minor niggle is
that while some industry people like you and Ray
write very well, in general academics are better
and faster at it. That said a manuscript produced
by a committee will always be a bit of a camel(39).
In response Glenn writes:
Your comments about ILSI and academic/industry
co-authoring are a great summary of yesterday’s
IFBiC [ILSI International Food Biotechnology
Committee] meeting – we have (I guess you would
say “finally”) seen the light and will be implement-
ing an advisory group that is predominantly popu-
lated by academic and non-industry scientists (to
provide overall strategic direction) – and for future task
force efforts, to have academic/regulatory scientists
be the “Core” – that meets initially with a broad tri-
partite group – but then completes the work on their
own – bringing it back to the group not for “approval”
but for a final reality check (or whatever). : : : And the
authorship of the “unintended effects” paper (if it mate-
rializes) –would be academic and non-industry – I feel
I am mainly coordinating, at best : : : (39).
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What becomes clear from this exchange is the input that
industry partners and ILSI itself have to articles that list aca-
demic and non-industry authorships listed. Initiating pro-
jects through a ‘tri-partite group’ – with representatives
from academia, industry and government –which then del-
egates this to academics who later bring academic work
back for industry and ILSI’s ‘final reality check’ illustrates
the scope for influence(39). This aligns with ILSI’s belief that
‘it is in the public interest to bring together scientists from
industry, academia and government to address scientific
issues of public health concern’(21).
Notably, such an exchange validates Mars Inc.’s
acknowledgement that two of its employees were cc’d
into emails about a research project leading to the con-
troversial Annals of Internal Medicine article discussed
above, which led Mars to state publicly that it would com-
municate to ILSI the inappropriateness of such emails,
while emphasising that ‘the paper undermines the work
of public health officials and makes all industry-funded
research look bad : : : ’(40). Mars Inc. labelled this as ‘advo-
cacy’ for industry – its own language – although ILSI
maintains publicly that it ‘explicitly prohibits its member
entities from ‘advocat[ing] the commercial interests of
their member companies or other parties’’(21).
Disseminating favourable material to decision
makers and/or the public through International
Life Sciences Institute or International Life
Sciences Institute’s organised events with
academics
Publicly, ILSI states that it ‘does not lobby, nor does ILSI
seek to influence individuals, positions, and/or specific
policy’(21). Rather, ILSI maintains that it ‘brings forward
precompetitive science that informs actions by industry,
government, academia, and/or other researchers’(21).
Indeed, ILSI maintains that it partners with different enti-
ties, and the Platform for International Partnership has
long formed part of ILSI’s core strategy to influence at
the international level or as ILSI’s own meeting minutes
phrase it, to manage ‘ILSI’s interactions with WHO
and FAO’(41).
We note that in board meeting minutes obtained via
FOI requests, amendments were proposed (and then
passed) to ILSI’s bylaws to ensure that its status as an
organisation in official relations with the WHO could
be maintained. This followed from concerns by the
WHO about ILSI India’s ties to a company with connec-
tions to the tobacco industry, leading to a proposal to
remove ILSI’s status. The minutes make clear that through
the process, ILSI’s status as a non-governmental organisa-
tion was being called into question, as the WHO had come
to the conclusion that ILSI should be regarded as a ‘private
sector entity’. As the minutes detailed, the WHO Executive
Board has four categories – (1) non-governmental organi-
sations, (2) private sector entities, (3) philanthropic
foundations and (4) academic institutions – and ILSI cate-
gorised itself as a scientific/academic entity in an online ques-
tionnaire distributed byWHO(42). Rather notably, ILSI was
willing to forgo recognition at theWHO if it listed ILSI as a
‘private sector entity’. The minutes state: ‘ : : : [s]hould
WHO insist on calling ILSI a private sector entity, ILSI
may have to end all activities with WHO to avoid such
a classification’(42). The minutes highlight that the
WHO views ILSI differently than ILSI regards itself. ILSI
contests its view, we suggest, because if it was consid-
ered a private body, this could threaten both ILSI’s regu-
latory and tax situation in the US, where its operation
centre, and because this would amount to recognition
that ILSI is an extension of industry rather than a publicly
beneficial non-profit organisation as ILSI maintains pub-
licly. The WHO declined to renew ILSI’s special status in
2017 in any event.
Certainly, the public–private partnerships’ approach
guides ILSI to engage with policy makers and national
organisations that do lobby. We found email correspon-
dence from 2015 that reveal how ILSI-produced guide-
lines on public–private partnerships were promoted
at a National Academy of Sciences meeting. In its Sympo-
sium Session proposal, ILSI sets out the aim of the session,
to address:
: : : the evolving role of industry funding in nutrition
research and explore existing public-private partner-
ships that are leveraging available resources to make
advances in nutrition science(42).
In a reply email to Malaspina, Suzanne ‘Suzie’ Harris, then-
Executive Director of ILSI, answers his enquiry about the
adoption of ILSI’s guidelines by saying:
The meeting yesterday was very successful. Four
professional societies – ASN, IFT, AND (new name
for the ADA) and IAFP (International Association
for Food Protection) – all agreed to endorse the pub-
lic-private partnership approach and will so state in
upcoming journal editorials. Dr. Michael McGinnis
encouraged these societies to work to remove bar-
riers to having everyone work together to solve pub-
lic health problems. So a real feather in Eric’s cap!(42)
This perspective is further promoted on the Oxford
University Press page for ILSI’s journal, Nutrition
Reviews(43). The emails reveal that ILSI uses its platforms
to promote this industry being at the table in discussions,
research and meetings, in effect advocating for industry
engagement. ILSI suggests that this is so as to ‘address
topics of common interest’ and that ‘its unique public-
private structure : : : fills knowledge gaps and serves
society in ways that any one entity on its own cannot.
ILSI does not lobby, conduct lobbying activities, or make
policy recommendations’(44).
But does ILSI enforce these policies? ILSI published a
press release in 2015, published on its website in 2019, that
details sanctions that it placed on ILSI-Mexico for engaging
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in lobbying behaviour(45). However, other email exchanges
we see involve Malaspina in June 2015 engaged in an email
chain, which includes Suzie Harris, then-ExecutiveDirector
of ILSI, concerning then-WHO Director General Margaret
Chan, who had raised questions about sugar-sweetened
products. In these emails he states:
We must find a way of some one [SIC] such as a
famous scientist arrange to pay her a visit. Jim
Hill or some one [SIC] of similar stature or a US
Government scientist. As the President of ILSI I had
a special and productive luncheon with the former
DG, Dr Nakajime in 1995 at his private dining room
in the WHO Geneva Headquarters to tell him about
ILSI and how the two organisations could work with
each other. In 1999 I visited the newDGMrs Brutland
in Geneva, when I invited her, on behalf of theWorld
Economic Forum, to come to the Davos meeting of
1999, and be the Keynote Speaker at the Food
Governors special dinner : : : By the way, the future
Coke President, Mr Neville Isdell attended that dinner
withme. In summary I am suggesting that collectively
we must find a way to start a dialogue with Dr Chen.
If not, she will continue to blast us with significant
negative consequences on a global basis. This threat
to our business is serious(40).
What we see here is historic contextual information from
the Founder of ILSI, suggesting that prior to his retirement
in 2001, the organisation lobbied international leaders
regularly, and he proposes a similar approach now. We
note that Malaspina, while no longer leading ILSI, still con-
tinues to represent the organisation at events, conferences
and on its socialmedia, showing his continued engagement
and influence. It is clear that the organisation’s own
founder sees its role as one of lobbying and advocacy, sug-
gesting further investigation is warranted. We also found
statements reporting that ILSI works with other bodies like
the IFIC to disseminate information favourable to industry,
stating that ‘ILSI generates the scientific facts and IFIC com-
municates them to themedia and public’(46). This suggests a
need to explore how ILSI is extending its influence and
authority through public relations and science communica-
tion and not just research.
Suppression of views that do not support industry
As the emails about Margaret Chan imply, Malaspina
holds the view that ILSI has a critical role in seeking
to dismiss views that were unhelpful to industry and
ILSI’s activities. The emails reveal active targeting of
those who raise questions about the health risks of
processed food ingredients and products. In particular,
ILSI has been active in convening those who question
the role of sugar-sweetened beverages in the global
obesity epidemic and challenging individuals who advo-
cate restrictions on sugar-rich beverage consumption.
In the email chain about Chan, Malaspina then asks
Dr Barbara Bowman, then CDC’s Director of the
Division for Heart Disease and Stroke Prevention:
Any ideas how we can have a conversation with
WHO? Now, they do not want to work with industry.
Who finds all the new drugs. Not WHO, but industry.
She is influenced by the Chinese Govt and is against
US. Something Must be done [SIC].(40)
Bowman then proceeds to provide advice on whom to
approach to influence the WHO on sugar and beverage
policy matters and promotes ILSI’s central role, stating:
Am wondering whether anyone with ILSI China,
perhaps Madame Chen, might have ideas. Another
thought, perhaps someone with connections to the
PEPFAR program. Or Gates and Bloomberg people,
many have close connectionswith theWHO regional
offices. : : : (40)
Notably, when Bowman’s interactions with Malaspina were
publicised(47), Bowman stepped down from her CDC role
and subsequently two members of US Congress requested
investigation by the Inspector General of the Department
of Health and Human Services(48). Critically, what we also
see here is that Malaspina sees ILSI has involved in targeting
of individuals who promote perspectives that could harm
corporate interests. It confirms the involvement that ILSI
has had historically, not only in disseminating food industry
narratives through persons like James O. Hill, then a promi-
nent researcher at University of Colorado Denver and
member of the National Academy of Medicine, now on
ILSI-NA’s Board of Trustees and Department Chair at the
University of Alabama, Birmingham, who was CC’d into
the email, but also in working to co-opt and convert dissent-
ers through targeted approaches.
Indeed, the email exchanges suggest that ILSI has
played a key defensive role for the food industry when
its interests are challenged. In an email from Michael
Ernest Knowles, a former Coca-Cola VP and ILSI pre-
sident, to Malaspina, Knowles lays out his views on
how the food industry should respond to challenges
regarding the health risks of its products. Knowles
recounts the need for:
the generation of credible, consensus science on the
issues hitting the industry – obesity and causative fac-
tors, sugar, low/no calories sweetener safety – in par-
ticular we need to use external organizations : : : (49)
The first organisation Knowles mentions that industry
should use for such product defence is ILSI. He notes that:
these issues need to be addressed now in the tradi-
tional manner of ILSI – in a transparent manner with
the best international experts and the full proceed-
ings published and further publicized by IFIC(49).
The emails continue with Malaspina explaining the
urgency of responding to the new dietary recommenda-
tions. This view is confirmed by Dr. James Hill, Director
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of the Center for Human Nutrition at the University of
Colorado Health Sciences Center, who states in an email
to Malaspina that:
: : :GEBN and ILSI could be, in my opinion, synergis-
tic in addressing this issue.
Frankly, we need the food industry to step up to pro-
vide more resources both to ILSI and GEBN. When
things like this happen, individual companies tend
to want to keep their head down. If they do this,
our opponents will win and we will all lose.
I do not think we can overestimate the importance of
dealing aggressively with this issue.
Jim(50).
GEBN was the Global Energy Balance Network, an
organisation established by Coca-Cola which promoted
a narrative that minimised the role of sugar-sweetened
beverages in the obesity epidemic, which has since been
shuttered(51). We suggest that these emails convey that
ILSI acts on behalf of industry to deploy international
experts to defend industry positions where unfavourable
legislation, policy or guidance is being pursued at national,
regional or international bodies, or by professional soci-
eties and groups.
Discussion
The emails we received and analysed thematically reveal
that various influential individuals who have held leader-
ship roles at ILSI historically or at present suggest that
ILSI promotes industry positions and influence while pur-
porting publicly to be neutral and guided by science. While
ILSI-funded research is becoming more transparent in
terms of declarations of ILSI’s industry ties, there are many
examples where industry links to research are obscured.
We are especially concerned by emails suggesting that
ILSI can be deployed to marginalise unfavourable posi-
tions, which supports the argument that it is a front for
industry when positions need to be quashed.
However, our research is subject to limitations. First, FOI
requests can, at best, provide only a partial picture and
there is an inevitable risk of bias in sampling and interpre-
tation. Second, some documents may have been deleted,
destroyed or withheld from us, so we do not claim the sam-
ple is comprehensive. Third, following best practices to
mitigate any potential analytical bias, we have reported text
‘in their own words’, with verbatim copies, and provide all
cited emails in appendices. This allows reader tomake their
own interpretations as well as to replicate our interpreta-
tions. Fourth, our research focused on ILSI, one prominent
international nutrition non-profit. We are unable to ascer-
tain the extent to which ILSI’s activities are reflective of a
more general pattern among corporate funded non-profits.
Finally, although we have been limited to studying a
set of those emails that have been released, which unlike
the tobacco documents archive cannot be exhaustive, they
are sufficient to reveal positive evidence that ILSI has acted
in ways which undermine its claims to be a scientifically
objective organisation. Within the emails we received,
we sought actively to disconfirm these findings in the email
document set (e.g. to look for instances that refuted our
findings) and were unable to do so. Taken together, the
available evidence is consistent with an alternative propo-
sition that ILSI acts to promote the corporate agenda of its
funders.
Without transparency and openness measures being
widely in place, industry interests can direct how research
funds routed through non-profit bodies are generally allo-
cated and what topics and findings will be supported for
publication. With regard to ILSI, when Mars Inc. withdrew
its support, its public statements raised concern about
potential corporate influence on the research which ILSI
funds. In its departure statement, the Company states that
‘[w]e do not want to be involved in advocacy-led studies
that so often, and mostly for the right reasons, have been
criticized : : : ’(25). The Company’s statements followed criti-
cism that research by ILSI was being used to cast doubt
on the influence of sugar on overweight and obesity, dis-
cussed below, and that disclosures in scientific publications
were problematically incomplete about what ILSI funding
actually involved.
These findings are troubling as previous research on
studies of sugar-sweetened beverages identified how
those with food industry funding were five times more
likely to report no positive association between weight
gain and obesity than those not reporting funding(1).
Industry-funded reviews are more likely to suggest that
evidence for a causal relation between sugar-sweetened
beverages and weight gain was weak(52). While ILSI-
funded studies are increasingly noting connections
between it and industry, not all declarations are com-
plete. ILSI does, however, suggest it is conducting
research into improving conflicts of interest issues
and has recently restructured and issued new gover-
nance directives(21). We hope that this indicates a move
forward from the behaviour discussed in the emails we
received.
However, ILSI still engages in the conception, funding
and promotion of research, and it funds researchers to
travel to its meetings and to events run by other bodies,
while facilitating partnering between public and private
entities(21). Reimbursements of expenses are routinely
provided, according to ILSI itself(21). Between Mars Inc.
suggestion of advocacy and work being viewed in a
‘bad’ light(2), and past research which suggests even
benefits not just funding can influence favourable
messaging(29), there is cause for concern and on-going
follow-up research. The continued pushing of a partner-
ship model should be further explored in light of ILSI’s
recent reforms.
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Given theWHOposition and the issues raised by former
member Mars Inc., we call for ILSI and other similar
industry-backed non-profits, which are in effect bodies that
are an extension of these industry actors, to be recognised
as private sector actors, and for their claims of scientific
neutrality to be subject to intense scrutiny by those engag-
ing with the content that they produce. We also argue that
conflict of interest statements must become more robust
when such bodies provide funding, detailing how those
bodies are themselves funded and what non-grant support
and reimbursements have also been provided in the past
and present studies. Where scientists, academics and gov-
ernment officials receive support channelled by industry
through ILSI, such as travel awards and conference
expenses, this too should be acknowledged both in peer-
reviewed and non-peer-reviewed content. Currently, the
failure to include robust declarations on all outputs
means the media and others risk promoting industry-
sponsored research as independent and objective with-
out an ability to judge any potential bias and influence.
Additional research is needed to ensure that journals
with links to such organisations are truly independent, with
robust peer-review and editorial processes, or whether
industry influence extends into editorial decision-making.
It is still unclear whether ILSI’s advocacy extends to the
content of the research it funds and its journal and publica-
tions. Further research is needed.
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